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ABSTRACT 
Over the past decade, sales of Fair Trade agro-products have risen sharply, fuelled by 
innovative marketing campaigns that use imagery to ‘connect’ Western consumers to 
impoverished farmers in developing countries. The success of Fair Trade has led to 
speculation over whether its portfolio could be broadened to include non-agricultural 
products, a debate which, in recent years, has focused heavily on the precious minerals and 
stones being extracted by impoverished artisans. A lack of policy oversight, however, has 
resulted in Fair Trade being interpreted very differently in this context. In the absence of 
certified internationally-recognized guidelines to consult for assistance with the 
implementation of Fair Trade mineral schemes, designers have drawn inspiration from a 
global mining development agenda that has become heavily preoccupied with anti-corruption 
and traceability. This paper draws on the case of Malawi’s NyalaTM ruby, described as a ‘Fair 
Trade Gem’ by its supplier, to illustrate how ethical mineral programmes are potentially 
being misbranded as Fair Trade. Although the scheme delivering NyalaTM ruby to markets is 
supplying a traceable commodity, in the process helping to alleviate consumers’ concerns 
about conflict minerals, it seems to be providing very little benefit to poor producers — the 
primary objective of Fair Trade. 
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‘Fairtrade has already come on a breath-taking journey. We’ve established a proven model for doing business 
differently, which is already bringing tangible positive impacts for millions of people in farmers’ organizations 
and their wider communities, who have been able to improve their lives, and start to tackle the poverty and 
disadvantages they face’.1 
- Harriet Lamb, CEO Fairtrade International, 2012 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past decade, a number of ethical consumption and production schemes have 
been launched. The most successful — and which today, are considered the flagship 
interventions in this area (Bezençon and Blili, 2011) — have been those implemented under 
the ‘umbrella’ of Fair Trade, a global campaign which uses imagery and innovative labelling 
to influence purchasing. The stated raison d'être of Fair Trade is to empower the developing 
world’s smallholder farmers by providing conduits to markets of ‘socially and 
environmentally conscious consumers in the North’ (Murray et al., 2006: 180).  It is a system 
which serves as a ‘second-best proxy’: although ‘situated’ within a global policy structure 
that marginalizes small producers and not constituting justice itself, Fair Trade ‘offer[s] a 
form of justice-emulation or justice-promotion in the absence of justice being 
institutionalized at the global level’ (Walton, 2010: 434). It achieves this by ‘interven[ing] in 
the ordering of the matrix of global capitalism whilst [remaining] firmly embedded in it’ 
(Adams and Raisborough, 2008: 1166).  
The success Fair Trade has had with bringing to the market a variety of smallholder-
cultivated goods, including various teas and coffees, cocoa and bananas, has fuelled 
speculation over whether its portfolio could be broadened to include non-agricultural 
products. In recent years, this discussion has focused heavily on the precious minerals and 
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 http://www.fairtrade.net/single-view+M5e9f4b46d47.html (Accessed 12 July 2013). 
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stones extracted by artisans, many of whom, much like the smallholders being targeted by 
national and international Fair Trade organizations, are heavily impoverished and have low 
market access. With there being a great deal of emotion behind, and thought put into, most 
jewellery purchases, proponents of Fair Trade see enormous potential with launching 
schemes which also seek to engage consumers through imagery. As with widely-consumed 
‘tropical’ fruits, the idea being proposed is to ‘socially re-embed commodities, so that items 
arrive at the point of consumption replete with information regarding [the] social and 
environmental conditions under which they were produced and traded’ (Raynolds, 2002: 
415). As Goodman (2004: 893) explains, doing so ensures that ‘Fair trade’s moral economy 
is written on the commodities trafficked from one part of the globe to another, connecting 
these places in a novel economy of semiology’.  
For the ‘tropical’ agricultural goods at the heart of the Fair Trade campaign, emphasis 
has been placed on establishing ‘an association with small farmers and families’, a strategy 
which has proved highly effective ‘because it evokes populist images of smallholders 
working on their own land and struggling to remain independent and autonomous, as the 
market inexorably draws them and their labour into commodity markets’ (Luetchford, 2007: 
2). These ideas have certainly influenced purchasing by grafting a sizable scar on the 
consumer’s conscience. As demonstrated by a host of studies (e.g. Loureiro and Lotade, 
2005: Howard and Allen, 2008), armed with the knowledge that a premium is being used to 
support the producers they ‘see’ on packaging, a large share of consumers are now willing to 
pay slightly more money for Fair Trade products. Many also believe that the groups of 
farmers supplying the certified products they purchase are guaranteed a floor price when 
market prices are low; provided with credit to support their activities; and have in place long-
term relationships with importers and cooperatives (after Levi and Linton, 2003). Beginning 
as a grassroots movement in the 1960s, initially popularized by ‘alternative trade 
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organizations’ and surfacing in response to glaring inequalities between developed and 
developing countries, Fair Trade has rapidly gained momentum over the past two decades 
(Elder et al., 2012; Raynolds, 2002; Wilson, 2010). During this period, it has evolved ‘from 
an informal network of activists and producers’ into a ‘structured set of actors whose 
collective adherence to “fair” principles is guaranteed by external certification programs’ 
(Marston, 2013: 162). In 2011, global sales of Fairtrade International (FLO) goods alone 
were in the range of US$ 6.6 billion.2  
Several early critiques of Fair Trade (see e.g. Levi and Linton, 2003; Young and Utting, 
2005) provided reassurance to enthusiastic customers, painting an extremely positive picture 
of the network. The literature, however, has since taken on a slightly more critical tone in 
response to a series of questions raised about the true impact of certified products in producer 
countries (see e.g. Bassett, 2010; Bezençon, 2011). Aside from the obvious criticism of Fair 
Trade remaining a ‘second best proxy’ and not seriously challenging the status quo, there 
have been repeated calls for greater clarification of which producers are, in fact, being 
targeted and why, as well as what positive change — if any — the movement is bringing to 
poor farming communities across Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Griffiths 
(2012: 360) summarizes some of the observations made thus far:  
It has been shown that a small amount of the extra amount that consumers pay for 
Fairtrade gets even as far as the exporter. In a few cases, it may be as much as half; in 
many cases it is much less. Much of the extra price paid, the donation, goes either in 
high profit in the rich countries, or in the Fairtrade organisations’ administration costs 
and their cost of collecting donations.   
 
These concerns underscore why a deepened analysis of the nuances of the Fair Trade 
network, how it operates and where monies are flowing within its structures must take place 
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 FLO is the dominant certifier of Fair Trade products. See www.thenews.coop/article/global-fairtrade-certified-
sales-grow-12-66b-2011 (accessed 11 January 2013). 
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before any consideration be given to broadening the agenda to include a highly-complex 
sector such as mining. This is important for two reasons, the first being the scale of the 
challenge. Whilst on the surface, it may appear that the smallholder farmer and the artisanal 
miner3 face similar challenges, in practice, it is very different.  Each is confronted with a 
unique set of circumstances, a direct result of the marked differences in the value of the 
commodities they produce, the markets they supply and the actors controlling their 
production chains: unlike diamonds and other gemstones, there is little chance of civil 
violence erupting over bananas or grapes. The second reason is that, in the absence of 
detailed information about the organization of precious metals and gemstone production, 
programmes which target minerals have evolved in a policy ‘vacuum’. In the absence of 
internationally-recognized standards and guidance, a wide range of definitions of ‘fair’ have 
gestated and certification schemes have developed rather autonomously. Not surprisingly, 
few of the programmes that have emerged from this ‘vacuum’ align with the criteria of Fair 
Trade accreditation bodies such as FLO-CERT or come remotely close — at least on paper 
— to mirroring the certification schemes currently in place for ‘tropical commodities’. 
 The purpose of this article is to provide an extended analysis of how Fair Trade 
mineral schemes are conceived, and to critically reflect on the socio-economic implications 
of the ‘ethical mining’ agenda they are shaping. The analysis draws heavily on the case of 
Malawi’s NyalaTM ruby programme, one of a range of Fair Trade mineral schemes that have 
been launched over the past decade. The article argues that, in the absence of a blueprint for 
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 Artisanal mining is defined here as low-tech, labour-intensive mineral extraction and processing. In 
sub-Saharan Africa, a large percentage of this activity is undertaken by families and other small 
groups (colleagues, inhabitants of the same village, extended families, etc.). These producers 
generally have profit-sharing agreements in place. The region’s ASM communities are made up of a 
diverse range of people, including the ‘pit owner’ or manager, diggers and washers, and generally 
lack technological and financial resources. Throughout this article, ‘artisanal mining’ and ‘small-scale 
mining’ are used interchangeably.   
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Fair Trade minerals, conceivers of such — what are now widely considered to be — 
landmark programmes have drawn inspiration from a mining development policy framework 
which has become overly preoccupied with transparency and traceability.  
 
 
ESTABLISHING AND RE-ROUTING THE POLICY AGENDA FOR ‘FAIR TRADE’ 
MINERALS 
 
For a number of Fair Trade ‘tropical’ commodities, including various teas, coffees and fruit, 
there seems to be some discrepancy between what consumers believe they are buying and 
what they are actually purchasing. The gap could be even larger for minerals.  
With the images of the general Fair Trade campaign weighing heavily on their 
consciences, numerous consumers have started calling for jewellery to be manufactured using 
minerals that have been sourced responsibly.4 These consumers have subconsciously fused 
the positive imagery projected by Fair Trade agro-campaigns with the images of hazardous 
and at times, exploitative, artisanal precious mineral and stone production. They appear to 
genuinely believe that purchases of the ‘ethical’ jewellery they have managed to usher into 
numerous high street retail shops are helping to alleviate the hardships of numerous 
subsistence mining groups. Whilst in most cases, there is little reason to believe that minerals 
are being sourced irresponsibly, with few exceptions, the ‘ethical’ jewellery being supplied is 
a significant departure from what consumers have come to recognize ‘Fair Trade’ to mean. A 
broadened understanding of the mining ‘equivalents’ of the farmers being targeted by Fair 
Trade underscores the magnitude of this disparity. 
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 See www.mvimarketing.com/jcoc.php (accessed 12 May 2012) for research conducted by the 
Jewellery Consumer Opinion Council. 
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The impression being conveyed by a number of Fair Trade bodies is that certified 
agro-schemes target marginalized farmers who, in exchange for complying with a range of 
rather stringent standards, are paid a premium for their produce and connected to 
international markets. This message is made clear in the mandates of most organizations 
operating at all levels of the network. The Fair Trade Federation, for example, stresses that 
‘Fair Trade is a strategy for poverty alleviation and sustainable development’, and therefore 
seeks to ‘create opportunities for economically and socially marginalized producers’.5 The 
Fairtrade® Foundation advocates much of the same, championing Fair Trade as ‘a strategy for 
poverty alleviation and sustainable development’, the purpose of which ‘is to create 
opportunities for producers and workers who have been economically disadvantaged or 
marginalized by the conventional trading system’.6 In the mining sector, the most 
‘economically disadvantaged’ and ‘socially marginalized’ producers are the artisanal 
operators who struggle to secure licenses, are generally excluded from donor assistance 
programmes and, unable to access financial support through formal channels, often fall prey 
to predatory middlemen (Hilson and Pardie, 2006). Over the past two decades, the donor 
community’s approach to regulating and assisting these individuals has been noticeably 
laissez-faire: a shortage of information on the whereabouts of activities, the demographics of 
the industry’s participants, and their struggles and needs has crippled efforts to formalize 
operations, and at times spawned highly inappropriate support measures. Organizations with 
preconceived notions of Fair Trade, therefore, have encountered very little resistance from 
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 www.fairtradefederation.org/ht/d/sp/d/sp/i/8447/pid/8447 (accessed 12 April 2012). 
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www.fairtrade.org.uk/what_is_fairtrade/fairtrade_certification_and_the_fairtrade_mark/the_fairtrade_
mark.aspx (accessed 15 April 2012). 
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donors and policy makers, whose calls for the inclusion of marginalized artisanal miners in 
national rural development strategies and policies have amounted to little more than rhetoric.  
What types of programmes have emerged from this policy ‘vacuum’? Three critical 
reflections are offered here, which not only help to answer this question, but also explain why 
the agenda for Fair Trade minerals is moving in the direction it is, and ultimately, why 
schemes such as NyalaTM ruby are now, rather inexplicably, seen as inspiring interventions in 
this area. The first point is that few, if any, Fair Trade mineral schemes seem to be zeroing in 
on the poorest artisanal miners — again, the mining ‘equivalents’ of the smallholders being 
targeted by agro-schemes. This comes as no surprise because, as indicated, there is simply no 
pressure being applied by donors and policy makers to do so, which has enabled individual 
organizations to arrive at their own definitions of ‘fair’ and determine who to target on their 
own.  An appropriate definition of ‘fair’ seems to be an issue which the network’s governing 
bodies themselves have long struggled to identify; the overarching problem is that ‘unlike 
many green and organic products, there are no clear standards about what fair trade means’ 
(Hira and Ferrie, 2006: 108). With agro-products, however, there are at least basic principles 
to fall back on for guidance should schemes show signs of unravelling over polarizing 
viewpoints on definitions of ‘fair’. The same cannot be said for minerals, for which again, 
there is no consensus on how these principles apply. 
 The second point is what the Fair Trade minerals manifesto could become in the 
absence of a robust blueprint: too aligned with a mining development agenda, which, as 
indicated, has become increasingly preoccupied with transparency, anti-corruption and 
accountability. Whilst traceability is undoubtedly a crucial aspect of Fair Trade, it is by no 
means its only component; nor is it its most important strand. In recent years, a number of 
mineral traceability schemes have emerged, particularly in East Africa. The designs of each 
are grounded heavily in the framework for a ‘responsible global supply chain’ presented in 
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the OECD’s ‘Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from 
Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas’ (OECD, 2010). This collaborative government-
backed multi-stakeholder initiative was developed with inputs from the OECD, eleven 
countries of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (Angola, Burundi, 
Central African Republic, The Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia),7 industry partners, civil society and the 
United Nations. Its aim is to ‘cultivate transparent mineral supply chains and sustainable 
corporate engagement in the mineral sector with a view to enabling countries to benefit from 
their natural mineral resources and preventing the extraction and trade of minerals from 
becoming a source of conflict, human rights abuses, and insecurity’ (ibid.: 3). The main focus 
of these initiatives, however, is to provide a ‘chain of custody tracking from mine to export at 
country level, regional tracking of mineral flows through the creation of a database on their 
purchases, independent audits on all actors in the supply chain and a monitoring of the whole 
mineral chain by a Mineral Chain Auditor’ (Bleischwitz et al., 2012: 27). As a result there is, 
as indicated, a real risk of ‘fair’ or ‘ethical’ in this context becoming too strongly associated 
with ‘traceability’. This appears to have already happened with Fairtrade and Fairmined 
Gold, ‘the world's first independent ethical certification system for gold’.8 With so few 
miners being able to comply with the Fairtrade and Fairmined Gold standards (Hilson, 2008), 
traceability or what is described as a commitment to ‘offering the first transparent and 
traceable supply chain for artisanal and small-scale gold mining’ (ARM, 2010: 13), has, 
almost by default, become the centrepiece of its mandate. 
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 The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region was established in 2006 in recognition of 
the political instability in these countries. As part of its mission to ameliorate and prevent cross-border 
conflicts amongst this group of nations, it has established a regional certification mechanism for 
cassiterite, coltan, wolframite and gold.   
8
 www.fairtrade.org.uk/gold/ (accessed 15 July 2012). 
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 This leads to the third and final concern: selective empowerment. As Bezençon (2011: 
66) explains, this has been ‘a general concern about Fair Trade’ — that it can be exclusionary 
because of ‘its propensity to generate elite producers...or its inability to integrate many 
producers’. In many instances, it has been observed that its standards can only be accessed by 
the resourceful elite, at the same time excluding a much larger group of more needy 
individuals (Mohan: 2009). The most illustrative example of this in the mining sector is again 
the Fairtrade and Fairmined Gold standards, the design of which were largely informed by a 
collection of rather unique operations, including those of Oro Verde, widely heralded as ‘the 
first company to devote itself entirely to the “ethical” production of gold’ (Bendell et al., 
2009: 13). Born in 1999 through strong alliances between community leaders, the activities 
of Oro Verde, which are located in the Choco Bioregion of Colombia, employ ‘green mining 
techniques’.9 Its achievements in the area of environmental management and as a 
community-level organization have attracted considerable praise, and culminated in a 
partnership with a number of bodies to form the Alliance for Responsible Mining (ARM). 
The extensive campaigning undertaken by ARM catalyzed the design and eventual 
certification of the Fairtrade and Fairmined Gold standards. Today, Oro Verde and a number 
of contiguous small-scale gold mining operations in Bolivia (Cotapata Mining Cooperative), 
Peru (e.g. Communidad Aurifera Relave S.A., MACDESA), Ecuador (Bella Rica) and 
elsewhere in Colombia (Cumbitara’s Small-Scale Mining Association, and Cooperativa 
Minera de la Llanada)10 are the principal suppliers of Fairtrade and Fairmined Gold. 
                                                          
9
 ‘Green mining techniques’ in this context are those which do not feat toxic additives such as cyanide 
and mercury. Oro Verde’s ‘green’ processes feature an array of hand implements and small machines, 
including panning trays and motorized water pumps. See www.greengold-
oroverde.org/ingles/ov_mineria_ing.html (accessed 3 January 2013) for the full details of its ‘green 
mining techniques’. 
10
 www.communitymining.org/index.php/en/our-initiative (accessed 13 February 2012). 
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 But whilst there is little disputing their ‘grassroots’ nature, these organizations were 
by no means impoverished; nor has certification of their gold effected much of a change in 
operation or tackled the type of local-level hardship Fair Trade bodies claim to be alleviating. 
Each cooperative was fully-functional and profitable long before ARM’s formation in 2004 
(e.g., Communidad Aurifera Relave S.A., 1993; Bella Rica Cooperative, 1993; MACDESA, 
1997; and Oro Verde, 1999), and is able to use ‘green mining methods’ because of unique 
local geological characteristics. The connection to the Western jewellery market provided by 
certification has simply enriched these relatively-affluent cooperatives even further by 
bolstering their sales. Most importantly, championing the practices of these mines as a Fair 
Trade ‘standard’ could prove detrimental to the artisanal gold mining industry, particularly 
operations in sub-Saharan Africa: whilst ‘the introduction of Fairtrade and Fairmined 
certification’ may, indeed, offer ‘new hope’ as is claimed, without any assistance, it is 
impossible for this group of miners ‘to change their practices so they can meet the 
requirements of the standard’11 because of the widespread poverty, geological constraints, 
logistical challenges and capital shortages they face. Collectively, these factors force the 
majority of the region’s artisanal miners to work illegally and in deplorable conditions. It is 
against this background that Hilson (2008) called for a radical ‘re-conceptualization’ and 
overhaul of these largely-exclusionary standards for implementation in sub-Saharan Africa. If 
left unchanged, the initiative will likely continue to nourish mainly an enclave of ‘elite’ 
operators.12  
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 See www.solidaridadnetwork.org/blog/child-labour-artisanal-gold-mines-mali-report-nbc-reporter-
richard-engel (accessed 24 May 2012).  
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 Despite these concerns, support for Fairtrade and Fairmined Gold programmes has been initiated in 
Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, with the support of Solidaridad, the Dutch-based development 
agency. Solidaridad, ARM and Fairtrade Africa are currently working to ‘certify small-scale gold 
miners in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania’ — specifically, eight mining organisations across the three 
countries. It is unclear which groups of miners are being target or if the concerns raised here are being 
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 In summary, a host of Fair Trade and ethical mineral schemes have emerged over the 
past decade (see Table 1 for a summary of selected initiatives).13 Few, however, align with 
the central objectives of Fair Trade itself. A lack of consensus over what constitutes ‘fair’ in 
the context of mining, as well as a generally low level of familiarity with the dynamics of 
artisanal mineral production, has created a significant policy ‘vacuum’, a sizable space in 
which organizations have been free to design and launch their own programmes, often with 
very little guidance and pressure from donors and policy makers. The next section of the 
article elaborates on this discussion by examining the case of NyalaTM ruby, which has been 
labelled a ‘Fair Trade Gem’ by its supplier. The case illustrates how the Fair Trade mineral 
schemes that have emerged from this policy ‘vacuum’ have come to fruition, and, drawing on 
the perspectives of a range of stakeholders, the debates they are fuelling.  
In line with the concerns raised in this section of the article, the NyalaTM ruby 
programme has sparked discussion among different actors on what constitutes ‘fair’. It seems 
that its main goal is to provide traceable production. Moreover, through this programme, an 
elite producer, not poor artisanal operators, is supplying retailers through Columbia Gem 
House Inc. The latter is a vertically-integrated gemstone mining, cutting and marketing 
company headquartered in Washington State, and the world’s largest supplier of brand-name 
exotic gemstones. Columbia Gem House has in place an exclusive agreement with the 
ownership of the Chimwadzulu Mine in Southern Malawi to supply its NyalaTM ruby line. 
Whilst this agreement has no doubt delivered some economic benefits to Malawi, findings 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
addressed comprehensively. See http://www.fairtradeafrica.net/networks-and-partners/gold-network/ 
(accessed 12 January 2013) and http://www.triplepundit.com/2012/05/dutch-organization-make-fair-
trade-gold-standard/ (accessed 8 January 2013). 
13
 On 21 July 2010 the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (‘Dodd-Frank 
Act’) was passed. It requires companies to declare whether the coltan, cassiterite, gold or wolframite 
originated from the Democratic Republic of Congo or adjoining country and, if so, to report on due 
diligence undertaken on the chain of custody. 
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from research carried out in-country and the jewellery community suggest that the labelling 
of NyalaTM ruby as a ‘Fair Trade Gem’ is an exaggeration, and a move that could be easily 
misconstrued as disingenuous and a marketing ploy, given what consumers have come to 
understand ‘Fair Trade’ to mean.  
 
Table 1 here 
  
‘CONSTRUCTING’ FAIR TRADE MINERAL SCHEMES: THE CASE OF 
NYALATM RUBY 
 
Although no official ‘Fair Trade’ programme exists for coloured gemstones at this time, a 
number of dealers and suppliers have championed the importance of ethical frameworks 
(Shor and Weldon, 2009). Notable among these is the aforementioned Columbia Gem House, 
which drafted the Quality Assurance and Fair Trade Gems Protocol, a collection of 
environmental, labour and health and safety standards. As stated on its website, the 
organization and its jewellery-manufacturing subsidiary, Trigem DesignsTM, now offer its 
consumers ‘the option of Fair Trade Gems’, which its management maintains are ‘closely 
tracked from mine to market to ensure that every gem has been handled according to these 
strict protocols’.14 To ensure adequate supply, it has forged contracts with individual mines 
across the world, including Chimwadzulu, again, the source of its NyalaTM ruby. Doing so 
has facilitated its transformation into a vertically integrated operation, putting it in a position 
to cut, polish and treat coloured stones it sources — including NyalaTM ruby — for retailers. 
It is one of a number of companies in the coloured gemstone sector that has consolidated its 
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 http://www.fairtradegems.com/fair_trade_gems/ (accessed 13 June 2012). 
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practices in recent years. As Cross et al. (2010: 15) explain, because ‘[the] industry is highly 
fragmented at all levels’, to avert risk and provide superior product to customers, 
organizations ‘have integrated different sections of the value chain from source to supply’. 
By consolidating its activities, Columbia Gem House has become one of the largest players in 
the industry. 
In 2003, MINEX, a UK-based company which, at the time, held the mining lease at 
Chimwadzulu, secured the services of Columbia Gem House to promote its stones. The 
partnership yielded, inter alia, NyalaTM ruby, the first collection of which was made available 
for US retailers in February 2004. These stones are of extremely high quality and therefore, 
have considerable market potential. Their branding as a ‘Fair Trade Gem’, however, is cause 
for concern: Columbia Gem House has likened the potential impact of its Gems Protocol to 
that of certified agro-schemes. Notably, the organization states on its website that ‘when 
conscientious consumers sip their fair trade coffee, the fingers that hold their cups can be 
adorned with Fair Trade Gems from Columbia Gem House, Inc.’,15 the implication being that 
purchases of NyalaTM ruby are also mobilizing and empowering poor rural masses.  
How close has the organization come to emulating certified agro-schemes, and more 
broadly, what makes NyalaTM ruby a ‘Fair Trade Gem’ in the eyes of management? 
Moreover, what are the views of other key stakeholders on this labelling and the impacts of 
the scheme in rural Malawi? The analysis that follows critically engages with these questions, 
drawing upon feedback from semi-structured interviews conducted by the author with key 
actors in the commodity’s supply chain. The research was conducted in two parts. First, semi-
structured interviews were conducted in Malawi with government officials, small-scale 
mining representatives and management of the Chimwadzulu mine. These took place in the 
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cities of Lilongwe and Blantyre, as well as in and around the mine site itself. Following 
transcription and analysis of these interviews, a second round of semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with the main stakeholders from the retail side, specifically, representatives 
at Columbia Gem House and its UK distributor, Fairtrade Gemstones (hereafter referred to as 
the ‘Distribution Consortium’), and selected North American-based retailers which stock the 
stones (See Figure 1 for an overview of the supply chain for NyalaTM ruby). From these 
interviews, it is clear that the NyalaTM ruby programme is more reminiscent of a basic 
community development exercise in its embryonic phases than ‘Fair Trade’. 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
Imagery for Marketing 
 
‘I have not visited the village…Anyway, I believe…I trust [my supplier]...I believe 
they are Fair Trade because that is what they tell me’. 
- Jeweller, California, USA16 
 
Sales of Fair Trade ‘tropical’ products have risen sharply in recent years in large part because 
of the success organizations have had with influencing purchasing patterns. As indicated, 
they have achieved this through innovative marketing campaigns which make extensive use 
of imagery of impoverished Third World producers, who are often depicted on packaging as 
operating in hazardous and/or exploitative conditions. These images have weighed heavily on 
the consciences of consumers.  
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 Interview, jeweler, 30/08/11 
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Many retailers believe that jewellery purchases could also be influenced using similar 
methods. There is growing consensus that immediate change could be facilitated in the 
supply chains of coloured gemstones such as ruby, which many consumers have come to 
understand have traditionally been sourced unethically. The potential for change is perhaps 
greatest in the United States, which, at present, accounts for 35 per cent of global retail sales 
of coloured gemstones, a position of dominance it has occupied for several decades (Shor and 
Weldon, 2010). There has long been widespread speculation about precious stones (emeralds, 
rubies and sapphires) being used by host governments to finance the purchasing of arms and 
munitions, and more recently, about gems such as tanzanite supporting terrorist groups such 
as Al-Qaeda (see Schroeder, 2010). Consumers are now well-informed about these issues; 
and, more generally, about how the informal, scattered nature of coloured gemstone 
production has given rise to an environment conducive to unregulated transactions (Cross et 
al., 2010; Schroeder, 2010). 
The main concern in the case of rubies is the political situation in Burma, which has 
traditionally provided close to 90 per cent of the world’s supply of rough. The country has a 
lengthy history of human rights abuses. In an attempt to deny Burma’s military junta, which 
has a controlling stake in official gemstone extraction activities and exports, mineral 
revenues, the US Congress and European Union have passed legislation banning imports of 
rubies mined in the country (Shor and Weldon, 2009).17 The sanctions imposed on Burma, 
combined with illicit smuggling in Madagascar, another important source of gemstones, has 
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 In 2003, the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act was passed, which banned trade (in the US) 
with Myanmar. But more comprehensive legislation was implemented in 2008 in the form of the Tom 
Lantos Block Burmese Act of 2008, which specifies that any ruby or jadeite mined in Myanmar 
cannot be imported into the US for commercial purposes. The move was deemed necessary since a 
significant share of Burmese gemstones are cut and sold in neighbouring Thailand. The European 
Union also implemented a series of complementary economic sanctions, including an embargo on the 
importation of gems sourced from Myanmar.  
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created a worldwide shortage in supplies of ruby and sapphire in recent years, leaving 
retailers scrambling to identify alternative sources. It is against the background of these 
circumstances that Malawi has emerged as a potentially strategic player for gemstones, 
particularly ruby. This was acknowledged by one manager of the Distribution Consortium 
during a personal communication: 
I know Madagascar production reasonably well. I also was very unhappy about the 
military junta in Burma back in the late 1990s and went to look for other ruby sources. 
That led me to the Malawi ruby project, long before the Burma sanctions were put into 
effect in the US… 
 
The ‘Malawi ruby project’ referred to here is Chimwadzulu which, despite having a low 
profile and at times, an unreliable supply, has been in production for over fifty years. During 
an interview with an officer from the Gemstone Association of Malawi,18 it was explained 
that a South African entrepreneur, Lawrence ‘Larry’ Hood, secured a mine exploration 
license in 1994 and, along with recruited UK partners, formed Minex. It was further 
explained that, ‘after operating for nearly twelve years, Minex was put on the stock exchange 
in London, where it was sold to an Australian man, popularly known as “Mr. Kennedy”, for 
UK£ 200,000’. The company, which has since changed its name to Nyala Mines Limited, 
currently holds a mining license at Chimwadzulu. It is with this company that Columbia Gem 
House forged an agreement for purchasing supplies of rough ruby. 
 Bans on imports of Burmese stones have limited the manoeuvrability of retailers, 
forcing many consumers to ‘settle’ for alternatives to ruby, including various garnets and 
spinel. One jeweller confirmed this in an interview, explaining that ‘[the ban] is affecting our 
supply…it has changed the immediate gratification and delivery of product, though people 
are generally supportive of the situation’. The political situations in both Burma and 
Madagascar have fuelled a strategic search for alternative supplies of ruby which is why, for 
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 The official ‘mouthpiece’ and administrative body for small-scale gemstone mining in Malawi. 
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the jewellers consulted, Chimwadzulu has such enormous appeal: all see the agreement 
forged between Columbia Gem House and the Malawian Government as a ‘win-win’ for each 
of the parties involved. First, and perhaps most importantly, there is the issue of the quality of 
Chimwadzulu’s rubies. One jeweller described them in an interview as ‘spectacular looking 
stones’. The consensus among the retailers consulted was that superior quality makes 
Malawi’s rubies so attractive; they are, as the same jeweller put it, ‘completely natural and 
untreated gems’. The fact that the stones are, in the words of another jeweller, ‘not doctored 
up before we get it’, provides the retailer with an advantage because ‘we [are able to] build a 
story around the fineness of the stone and the rarity, and create a bit more pride and 
ownership, to indicate how rare and special these particular gemstones are’.    
Second, in sourcing these ‘completely natural and untreated gems’, retailers believe 
they are genuinely having a positive impact on poor peoples’ lives in a democratic — albeit 
impoverished — developing country removed from the shackles of dictatorship. One retailer 
made this clear during an interview, a view echoed by all of the retailers consulted. The 
jeweller stated: ‘my impression is that by dealing directly with the people, they are helping to 
support the economy directly, and making sure that things are done in a fair and equitable 
way for everyone involved in the process, so that it will be something that builds a longer-
term relationship for the people, and that the economy is supported by a consistent 
relationship’. On its numerous websites, the Distribution Consortium has skilfully used 
imagery, similar to the way in which Fair Trade bodies mobilize consumers through pictures 
on the packaging of agro-products, to impress upon retailers that the acquisition of rubies 
from Chimwadzulu delivers a multitude of benefits to Malawi’s poor. One jeweller reflected 
on this in an interview, explaining that, ‘they [the Distribution Consortium] showed pictures, 
and they showed that…you see their [Malawians] faces in the picture and they were happy, 
they had a school, they had healthcare’. 
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In line with arguments raised earlier about imagery being the centrepiece of Fair 
Trade marketing strategy, it is evident that pictures and accompanying text which suggest that 
production at Chimwadzulu is ‘improving quality and lives’, and is carried out whilst 
‘protecting the environment’ and ‘protecting worker’s rights’,19 have engaged the jewellery 
community. At the time of this research, none of the retailers interviewed had visited 
Chimwadzulu or seemed to understand the mine’s production dynamics. But all were clearly 
enamoured by the messages espoused by the Distribution Consortium and more generally, the 
idea of it being able to supply ‘Fair Trade Gems’. The sense of belief now resonating in the 
jewellery community about the local-level impacts of ‘Fair Trade Gems’ such as NyalaTM 
ruby reinforces points raised by Mohan (2009) on the issue of trust. Specifically, the idea that 
because ‘“fairness” is not an attribute that consumers can check in the product as, aside from 
the label, Fair trade products are not distinguishable from conventional products’, 
organizations work on ‘encouraging consumers to base decisions on trust and charity rather 
than solely on market competition’ (ibid.: 25).  
The growing popularity of NyalaTM ruby among US retailers is a sign of their trust in 
the Distribution Consortium to deliver on its promise of supplying ‘Fair Trade Gems’. All of 
the jewellers consulted emphasized, during interviews, the importance of trust, particularly 
when sourcing commodities known to be associated with widespread human rights abuses, 
such as rubies. This trust, explained one California-based jeweller, needs to exist throughout 
the supply chain: 
I mean, what is the documentation going to be? Honestly, for me, if somebody came to 
me and said ‘look, here are the pictures, these are the miners, these are the living 
conditions’, I would need to really trust that person if he didn’t have the documentation. 
My customer would buy it because they trust me.20  
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 See http://www.trigemdesigns.com/home/ (accessed 15 June 2012). 
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Another jeweller echoed these sentiments, explaining that a major reason why a growing 
number of retailers ‘trust’ the NyalaTM ruby brand is because ‘the supplier goes there directly 
and deals with the people on the ground who are involved in the mining’. 
 But what exactly does the jewellery community perceive ‘fair’ to mean in this 
context?  Moreover, given the poor knowledge of the situation on the ground, in committing 
to purchasing gems such as NyalaTM ruby, what impact do they believe sales of these stones 
are having on livelihoods in rural Malawi? The next section of the paper seeks to answer 
these questions. 
 
 
Re-conceptualizing ‘Fair’ 
 
‘When we use rubies, we use NyalaTM ruby because they are traceable’.21 
- Jeweller, Washington State, USA 
 
It was argued earlier that many of the organizations which have developed ethical mineral 
supply chains have emphasized heavily the issue of traceability. What makes the case of 
NyalaTM ruby slightly unique in this regard, however, is that both the supplier and the retail 
community have been complicit in developing a working definition of Fair Trade that is far 
removed from those which underpin the movement itself. 
 Despite making numerous references to poverty alleviation in rural Malawi and the 
need for mining to be carried out in a fashion that yields development, all of the jewellers 
interviewed seemed heavily preoccupied with the issue of traceability. One jeweller pointed 
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out in an interview that knowledge of a stone’s origin ‘makes good business sense’ because 
‘the jewellery industry has been an emotional industry, celebrating the most important events 
in our life — marriage, christenings, anniversaries — and when people find out that this 
jewellery was derived from suffering, they don’t want that’. With the events in Burma and to 
a lesser extent, Madagascar, looming heavily on the consciences of consumers, it was 
explained that retailers have been pressured to provide details about the origin of supplies of 
rough rubies, which has affected the sourcing strategies for all gems. This was made clear in 
an interview with another jeweller: 
We have tried to seek out suppliers and manufacturers who can verify the sources of 
their products for us, in order to give our customers a better sense of what they are 
buying, to give them a better sense that it is not conflictual where it is coming from. 
Whether a diamond from Botswana or tanzanite from Tanzania…The best company we 
deal with on that is [the Distribution Consortium] — they do a great job with sourcing 
and helping you to present the products than a number of suppliers we have dealt with 
for years. They go direct to the source to procure the gemstones, to ensure that they are 
ethically sourced.22  
 
To its credit, the Distribution Consortium is satisfying retailers’ growing demands for 
transparency by supplying NyalaTM ruby, a traceable gemstone. As one senior manager 
explained in an interview, ‘a company such as ours must create a transparency to their supply 
chain [because] only then can they identify positive actions and negative actions along the 
chain [and] only in this manner can they begin to develop solutions to the negative aspects’. 
Two of Columbia Gem House’s five Quality Assurance and Fair Trade Protocols (Principle 
1. ‘Demonstrate to the customer where the gemstone they purchased originated’, and 
Principle 4. ‘Confirm that obtaining the stone was done legally’) focus on the issue of 
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traceability, underscoring the organization’s commitment to ‘Making the Supply Chain 
Transparent’.23 
 The main reason why these stones are being sourced altogether was made clear during 
interviews: their economic value. The attraction with NyalaTM ruby specifically is, as one 
jeweller clarified in an interview, ‘that it is not treated’. For centuries, several treatments — 
coatings, the application of oils and more recently, high-temperature, atmosphere-controlled 
heating — have been used to alter the appearance, and therefore the perceived value, of 
rubies (Shor and Weldon, 2009). The jeweller further explained that because no treatment is 
required in the case of Chimwadzulu’s rubies, ‘[it] makes it rarer [— that] you cannot offer 
your customer that level of authenticity with an Asian ruby’. All of the other jewellers 
consulted echoed this view. One explained that ‘the nature of the quality of the material being 
not treated is real special, as opposed to most everyplace else, where it is heat treated’, whilst 
another indicated that ‘the untreated aspect, the beauty of them…is cool’. Fully aware of 
jewellers’ desire to secure untreated corundum, the Distribution Consortium has raised 
awareness of the purity of NyalaTM ruby. A senior-level employee explained why: 
We believe the consumer is an integral part of a Fair Trade supply chain. The industry 
must be fair to them also and doing all sorts of disclosed and to not disclose (but never 
explained) treatments was just tricking the consumer. By working directly with the 
Nyala mine, we could control and clearly describe any treatments and their impact on 
rarity and value.24 
 
The premium placed by retailers on ‘natural stones’ could explain why two of the remaining 
three Quality Assurance and Fair Trade Protocols (Principle 2. ‘Identify what treatments have 
been done to the stone, if any’ and Principle 3. ‘Determine that the stone is of natural origin 
and not synthetic or imitation’) focus on the issue of treatment.  
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  A preoccupation with transparency and the allure of the gems themselves, however, 
have overshadowed other — more significant — producer-side aspects of the Fair Trade 
issue. Despite claims made by jewellers that ‘miners are fair waged’ and ‘the information we 
have gotten from them [Chimwadzulu’s managers] is that they have set up a healthcare 
facility and a school for the miners and their families’, and similar statements made by the 
Distribution Consortium itself, the ‘Fair Trade’ ruby programme now in place in Malawi 
appears to have facilitated little change on the ground. It seems that rather than identifying a 
marginalized group of producers and developing a scheme to empower them, in this 
particular case, a positive story was ‘constructed’ only after a viable deposit of a coveted 
gemstone was identified in a country free of autocratic rule and where product can be traced 
to its origin with relative ease.  
 Residents have clearly grown frustrated over what they see as Chimwadzulu’s 
continued lack of economic impact. This was made clear in an interview with a government 
officer, who explained that ‘although the mine has switched several hands over the years, the 
major issue of contention has been that people say they don’t see the exports and the value 
the mine brings to the community around the area’. Community development would become 
the centrepiece of the agreement forged between Nyala Mines Limited and the Government 
of Malawi on 20 October 2007 — which culminated in a ten-year mining license 
(ML0150/2007) — and the ‘Fair Trade’ scheme it would spawn. Enshrined in the agreement 
are a number of macroeconomic commitments, as well as scores of pledges to improve the 
social conditions around Chimwadzulu, which managers have packaged as ‘Fair Trade’: 
refurbishing the local hospital at Katsekela, and providing it, annually, with at least US$ 
20,000 in medical supplies; installing a solar panel at the hospital to provide lighting; 
refurbishing and continuing to support a local school; employing locals to work at the mine; 
and training Malawians in various aspects of the gemstone trade. Presently, Chimwadzulu 
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and surrounding communities are in a deteriorated state, largely because of the lengthy 
struggle to find a buyer for the mine and consequent fluctuations in production. A member of 
the Distribution Consortium’s mine management team at Chimwadzulu conceded having 
‘inherited a blueprint which has not fulfilled the agreement [with the government]’ because 
of declining output. The recent US$ 2 million investment in equipment and production 
facilities, however, is expected to increase output to 30–50 tonnes/day. It has left the same 
mine manager feeling optimistic about hitherto abandoned plans to support the community. 
The manager claimed in an interview of ‘having adopted this village’ and expressing a desire 
to ‘want to do something for these people’, including ‘building a health centre as well as 
refurbish the existing Katsekela Health Centre’. 
 For each of the retailers interviewed, traceability, not the development that their 
purchases potentially facilitated, was identified as the most important issue. Most, however, 
praised the development taking place at Chimwadzulu, although none seemed to have a 
detailed understanding of what type of work is being undertaken. Why, then, is the NyalaTM 
ruby scheme being championed as a ‘Fair Trade’ intervention? Part of the problem could 
stem from the literature, which regularly uses the terms Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) and Fair Trade interchangeably. It could, therefore, be the case that the Distribution 
Consortium views CSR as ‘Fair Trade’, despite the fact that it is the opposite — that ‘Fair 
Trade’, albeit only in particularly instances, could be a form of CSR (after Mohan, 2009). 
Drawing upon experiences for the cocoa sector, Chavaz (2008: 2) articulates the differences 
between the two concepts, reporting that ‘FT and CSR diverge…in how they address the 
vulnerability of cocoa farmers, in their response to the prevailing governance of the value 
chain, and in the level of consumers’ involvement they require’. As the author further 
clarifies, CSR emphasizes the delivery of social benefits to disadvantaged producers, and can 
only be considered Fair Trade if the measures being implemented challenge the ‘conventional 
25 
 
value chain’. Referring back to NyalaTM ruby, the pledges enshrined in the agreement forged 
between the Distribution Consortium and the Malawian Government, as well as the Quality 
Assurance and Fair Trade Protocols themselves, cannot be considered cornerstones of any 
Fair Trade programme, at least not in the conventional sense. This is because whilst plans to 
build a school and supply a health clinic at Chimwadzulu will no doubt deliver meaningful 
development to surrounding subsistence communities, they will not empower marginalized 
operators.  
Another potential source of the problem in this particular case relates to how the 
Distribution Consortium is marketing ‘Fair Trade Gems’ through its supply platform. This 
has undoubtedly confused many retailers. The Distribution Consortium has skilfully engaged 
buyers by associating its efforts with those being undertaken to certify agro-schemes, 
particularly coffee:  
Our Fair Trade Gems programme is part of a larger movement of companies in many 
industries who promote ethical practices toward employees and the environment. The 
ideas and principles behind Fair Trade have been gathering more and more support 
among consumers and businesses. Coffee is the most widely available Fair Trade 
product, with over 100 roasters offering Fair Trade-certified coffee.25 
      
The passage is highly misrepresentative, as it implies that schemes such as NyalaTM ruby 
mirror the Fair Trade schemes in place for products such as coffee, which is far from being 
the case. 
 For the programme in place at Chimwadzulu to be in any way complementary to the 
Fair Trade schemes instituted for smallholder farmers, it would, as explained earlier, need to 
target impoverished small-scale operators, a group which, in Malawi, numbers in the tens of 
thousands (Kamlongera, 2011). But as the discussion that follows explains, management at 
all levels of the Distribution Consortium and many of the retailers it supplies are reluctant to 
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embrace the needs of small operators. Ideologically, this runs counter to the objectives of Fair 
Trade.     
 
  
 
 
 
Omission of the Small Operator 
 
‘I have as I said adopted this village and I want to do something for these people…We are 
giving children footballs right now…’ 
- Mine manager, Chimwadzulu, Malawi 
 
In its various guises, Fair Trade has been marketed as a vehicle which empowers scores of 
poor producers. In exchange for complying with a set of standards, individuals are connected 
to consumers, protected from market irregularities and paid a premium for their produce. But 
as indicated, these guidelines are, at times, stringent, and can be more exclusionary than 
inclusive, consequently empowering elites. The Chimwadzulu project is no exception. 
 To its credit, the Distribution Consortium intends on using the NyalaTM ruby scheme 
as a foundation for other project-work which, its managers believe, could deliver significant 
benefits to Malawi if managed effectively. The Distribution Consortium has committed, in 
the agreement it has forged with the government, to establishing in the country a subsidiary 
corporate entity capable of cutting/marketing ‘lesser value’ corundum that could be marketed 
and sold locally. This was echoed in a communication with one of the Distribution 
Consortium’s senior managers, who explained that ‘we have committed to training local 
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people on all aspects of the project and [we have] been working to develop the start of a 
cutting industry in Malawi’. It is the other aspects of the agreement, however, that are highly 
contentious and which are, overall, in no way aligned with the principles of Fair Trade. 
 In addition to there being a 10 per cent royalty payable to the government upon export 
of rough corundum, it was agreed that Chimwadzulu would have 30 per cent ‘indigenous’ 
ownership. Initially, the Gemstone Association of Malawi was approached by the 
management of Minex and offered 10 per cent of the project’s shares but was unable to 
mobilize the funds. The possibility of involving the association as a minority owner, 
however, has not been revisited by the Distribution Consortium. A recent World Bank report 
argues that ‘[in Malawi,] artisanal and small scale mining (ASM) has potential to grow by 
increasing output and producing higher value products, especially cut and polished 
gemstones’ (World Bank, 2009: 4). In its attempts to design and implement a ‘Fair Trade’ 
structure at Chimwadzulu, the Distribution Consortium has, however, rather curiously, 
dismissed the needs of the sector’s operators entirely. The gemstone sector is often 
condemned for its highly illicit nature — specifically, for allegedly harbouring scores of 
middlemen, sponsors, informal traders and service-people (Cross et al., 2010). But most of 
the efforts undertaken to formalize its activities (in countries such as Zambia, for example) 
were destined to fail, crippled by a poor understanding of the dynamics and organization of 
the sector. Malawi’s ASM sector also appears to be highly informal, illicit and complex. 
According to the same World Bank report (World Bank, 2009), country-wide, activities 
provide direct employment to at least 40,000 people, most of whom operate without a license; 
occur seasonally as well as surface in a ‘rush type’ fashion; and extract a diverse range of 
commodities, including gemstones, aggregates, limestone, sand, ceramic clays and salt. 
Based on the descriptions provided in this report and elsewhere (e.g. Kamlongera, 2011), 
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much like a large share of ASM found across sub-Saharan Africa, Malawi’s operations are 
also poverty-driven, labour-intensive and rudimentary in design.   
It was explained in an interview with an executive of the Gemstone Association of 
Malawi that the stones recovered by the country’s artisanal miners are ‘sold to anyone — 
Israelis, Germans, Australians, British — who polish their stones at their home countries and 
sell them at auctions [and] I doubt if they have licenses [to buy], which explains why [so 
many] people smuggle the stones in most cases’. The problem with this arrangement, 
explained a mine manager at Chimwadzulu during an interview, is that ‘they [the villagers] 
get nothing on the black market — what a person would get for 10,000 Kwacha they are 
settling for 1,000 Kwacha on the black market’. The miners, local government officers and 
association executives consulted were in agreement that the Distribution Consortium could 
have fixed this problem by altering the dynamics of production to their benefit. The idea 
presented, though challenging, was to forge direct trade links with Malawi’s small-scale 
gemstone miners through the association, a move which, these local-level actors explained, 
would bring about positive change in the lives of many thousands of the country’s poorest 
people. It would certainly have more of the look of a grassroots Fair Trade scheme than the 
existing programme, which again, has prioritized the construction of schools and health 
facilities and the hiring of a small group of people to work at the mine. But rather than assist 
small-scale operators, mine management has potentially marginalized them even further. The 
head of the management team in place at the mine explained in an interview that they have 
‘fenced off’ the ‘Larry Hood Area where artisanal works are’ — that they will ‘focus on pits 
for a while or the seam because artisanal miners follow the seam’. The move reinforces 
claims put forward by Cross et al. (2010: 21) that ‘they [mining and exploration companies] 
have been known to “use” artisanal and small-scale miners as unpaid “geologists”, launching 
29 
 
large explorations of mineral deposits wherever there is evidence of small-scale mining 
activity’.  
Whilst all of the individuals interviewed from the Distribution Consortium — from 
managers at the mine to suppliers — praised the ‘Fair Trade’ ruby scheme in place at 
Chimwadzulu, the views solicited from community-level actors were very different. In 
possession of a mining license at Chimwadzulu up until the early-2000s, Lawrence ‘Larry’ 
Hood, as indicated, managed to lure investment from the UK, which catalysed the formation 
of Minex. The main investor, known locally as ‘Dr David’, engineered the sale of Minex to 
‘Mr. Kennedy’, the formation of the Distribution Consortium, the drafting of the agreement 
between the Malawian Government and Columbia Gem House, and the launch of the 
NyalaTM ruby scheme. All of the association’s executives and small-scale miners interviewed 
condemned the ‘Fair Trade’ agreement, questioning the level of benefit it delivers. The 
reason for the mounting local resistance, explained one executive in an interview, is the 
collective view of the citizenry that ‘Malawi has never benefitted from this mine since 1967, 
despite having produced all these best rubies in the world’. Another executive member even 
questioned, in an interview, the 30 per cent ‘indigenous’ ownership26 secured, as required by 
the agreement: 
This mine should go to indigenous Malawians because all of the proceeds will come 
back to Malawi. He [the manager and ‘indigenous’ owner] has two passports. It needs 
to be given to registered Malawian small-scale miners. We are losing millions and 
millions…We do not need a donor. We [the association] have written a petition to get it 
back into the hands of indigenous Malawians…’  
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 With the Gemstone Association of Malawi unable to mobilize funds to secure a stake in the mine, 
the Distribution Consortium turned elsewhere. In the end, a group of third generation Indian 
Malawians secured the required 30 per cent share. 
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A local government officer interviewed in Blantyre sympathized with these views, explaining 
that ‘the Gemstone Association of Malawi wanted to have the mine [for small-scale miners] 
because it fetches a lot of money, so there’s been a lot of cries from these guys’.  
 The Distribution Consortium, however, is adamant about not working with the 
country’s ASM operators. One of its high-ranking officials explained why in an interview: 
Don’t go the artisanal route. Wild and uncontrollable. No reason why they should put 
the money to buy houses and put nothing back into the community…I am sceptical of 
running up the Bolivian Andes and the Amazon Jungle and finding a miner and saying 
‘this is Fair Trade’ because it doesn’t work.        
 
Consequently, the mine itself has become an enclave, now separated from the surrounding 
villages which, for decades, have relied upon menial gemstone production for their 
livelihoods, drawing upon reserves from the ‘Larry Hood Area’. The highly-mineralized 
‘Larry Hood Area’ is now heavily policed, protected from what were described as 
‘encroaching small-scale operators’, a mine manager explaining in an interview that ‘we [at 
the mine] are armed to the teeth, and we shoot to kill because I don’t tolerate stealing’. The 
reluctance to work with ASM operators resonates deeply in the Consortium, and extends to 
even jewellers; most of the retailers consulted were also averse to the idea. One explained 
that ‘the logistics of [doing] this [partnering with small-scale miners]’ was a ‘big challenge’, 
whilst another indicated that ‘there are obstacles’ because ‘it’s a complicated thing to deal 
with the governments in these countries, to be able to develop the relationships with the 
producers and find the right person in government, etc.’. In what was one of the most 
revealing conversations, yet another jeweller explained that because ‘Africa is the Wild 
West…I think this is where you need oversight from First World countries that can pull this 
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off’, furthermore pointing out that ‘that’s why I sell the Ekati27 diamonds from BHP Billiton, 
because that’s the story I can tell my customers’. 
In the case of NyalaTM ruby, what story is the Distribution Consortium passing along 
to the jewellers they supply and, by extension, consumers? Reflecting on the scheme’s 
labelling, one jeweller explained in an interview that ‘I believe [it is] Fair Trade because…the 
fact that the people are paid fairly, including women, and that they have a school and health 
care…That’s why I think it’s Fair Trade’. The problem, however, is that this is not Fair 
Trade. In fact, ideologically, the approach being taken at Chimwadzulu seems antithetical to 
the underlying principles of Fair Trade. The unwillingness of the Distribution Consortium to 
understand and embrace the struggles of the most impoverished group (resident small-scale 
gemstone miners) seems counterintuitive, very different from what organizations in the Fair 
Trade network are trying to achieve — or at least what they claim to be doing — with 
smallholder farming. Armed with the knowledge that the retailers it supplies approves of the 
sourcing of rubies from a country such as Malawi, which, unlike Burma, has enjoyed a 
lengthy period of stability and democratic rule, the Distribution Consortium has skilfully 
crafted a story around the theme of ‘community mining’. In the absence of a blueprint, it, 
along with other organizations, has freely manoeuvred in a sizable policy ‘vacuum’, 
designing and implementing what has amounted to little more than a basic community 
development exercise, masqueraded as a Fair Trade scheme.  
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
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 The Ekati Diamond Mine is located in Northwest Canada, in the heart of First Nations territory. 
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The case study presented in this paper illustrates how convoluted the issue of Fair Trade 
minerals can become in the absence of universal guidelines and baseline criteria debated and 
agreed upon by a diverse group of stakeholders. At first glance, the decision to label NyalaTM 
ruby a ‘Fair Trade Gem’ seems rather arbitrary since the scheme itself is far removed from 
being a programme which ‘connect[s] disadvantaged producers and consumers, promot[es] 
fairer trading conditions and empower[s] producers to combat poverty, strengthen[s] their 
position and tak[ing] more control over their lives’.28 The initiative itself was conceived 
almost entirely outside of the host country, Malawi. The emergence of NyalaTM ruby and 
allied schemes, however, can be seen as a direct response to consumers’ growing awareness 
of the human rights abuses associated with many forms of mineral production and their 
growing demand for more traceable products. Suppliers have met these demands head-on, 
consolidating activities by forging deals directly with individual mines across the world and 
in the process, improving the transparency of production. The move aligns perfectly with a 
mining development agenda that has become heavily preoccupied with anti-corruption and 
improved transparency in recent years. But groups such as the Distribution Consortium have 
gone a step further, skilfully crafting stories about community development and erroneously 
labelling their work ‘Fair Trade’.  
 Should these organizations be blamed for steering the Fair Trade minerals agenda 
down a radically different path to that of Fair Trade agro-products? On the one hand, 
organizations are clearly abusing the autonomy they have been afforded, developing schemes 
in a sizable policy ‘vacuum’ which are, in no way, calibrated with the central tenets of Fair 
Trade. Lost in the efforts at Chimwadzulu, and a criticism raised regularly about Fair Trade 
in general, is the level of impact in the producing country itself. With NyalaTM ruby, it 
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became clear, during interviews, that the priority is the customer, not the impoverished 
Malawians who could be supplying the Distribution Consortium. One of the Distribution 
Consortium’s senior-ranking officials conceded as much in an interview. In fact, it seems that 
the focal point of the scheme’s design was retailers’ fixation with what one jeweller described 
as ‘the completely natural and unheated gems’, the transformation of Chimwadzulu into an 
enclave-type project reminiscent of most of the large-scale extractive projects that have 
emerged across sub-Saharan Africa to date a testament to the level of priority being placed on 
community development. This was made clear in an interview with another jeweller:   
That they are untreated and that they have a nice story. I mean I think the Fair Trade 
benefit is part of the story. You want to tell a story with your product. And it comes 
from Malawi. Right there is huge. We know where it comes from.  The untreated 
aspect, the beauty of them, the brand name is cool. It’s a little deer,29 right? They were 
untreated and they were sourced…Great story. 
 The Distribution Consortium’s lack of understanding of what Fair Trade constitutes was 
evident during several interviews. One of the more revealing statements was made by a 
Trigem DesignsTM employee who, in reference to the President of Columbia Gem House, 
declared in an interview: ‘he invented Fair Trade’. 
On the other hand, organizations cannot be blamed entirely for overlooking small-
scale miners in Fair Trade programmes because there is no requirement to do so. To date, few 
economic policies, national development programmes and development interventions 
implemented in sub-Saharan Africa have targeted ASM. Despite mounting evidence pointing 
to ASM being an indispensable economic activity in all corners of sub-Saharan Africa (see 
e.g. Banchirigah, 2008; Maconachie and Binns, 2007; Perks, 2011), it continues to feature 
peripherally in the region’s rural poverty alleviation policies and development programmes. 
In Malawi itself, whilst the most recent IMF Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper does indicate 
that ‘it [the government] will continue to provide extension services to small-scale miners to 
                                                          
29
 The reference made to a deer here is actually an antelope. Nyala is a Southern African antelope.  
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learn value added skills’ (IMF, 2007: 33), it offers few details on how this will be achieved. 
The document, much like the PRSPs of neighbouring countries, has a distinct agricultural 
‘flavour’, championing support for smallholder farming as the key to alleviating rural poverty 
in Malawi. A re-orientation in approach — one which places greater emphasis on ASM 
development — promises to be difficult.   
The problem is compounded by the region’s weak mining policies, which also 
overlook the importance of small-scale activity. Most rather focus on identifying ways to 
transform large-scale mining into an export-led industry and attract foreign investment to 
catalyze its development. Whilst both the Africa Mining Vision and the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative provide platforms for debate on ASM, it is evident, from the 
composition of the documentation, that safeguarding the wellbeing of the ASM sector is not a 
top priority of either. Even the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS)30 — widely 
considered to be the landmark intervention in the area of mineral transparency and 
accountability — fails to empower the ASM operator. Khamis (2007: 4) incorrectly refers to 
the KPCS as an example of an initiative ‘launched on behalf of the development of artisanal 
and small-scale miners of precious minerals’, despite this never being its intended purpose. It 
was rather launched (in 2003) specifically to improve the traceability of diamonds. In fact, it 
was not until four years after its launch that the Working Group on Artisanal and Alluvial 
Production (WGAAP) was established, following recommendations put forward at the 
Moscow Plenary meeting of the Kimberley Process in 2005. Though championed by some 
(e.g. Haufler, 2009) as a model for preventing the smuggling of conflict commodities, it 
remains unclear, even with the WGAAP now in place, what the KPCS is doing to empower 
the artisanal operators working in ‘the alluvial diamond mining areas’ the group believes are 
                                                          
30
 The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is a joint government, civil society, and 
industry initiative aimed at stemming the flow of rough diamonds used to finance wars. 
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in need of ‘effective internal controls’ to prevent ‘conflict diamonds from entering the 
legitimate diamond trade’.31 The lack of focus on artisanal mining provided the impetus for 
the Diamond Development Initiative32 to draft and launch the Development Diamond 
StandardsTM, a certification system designed to be accessible to independent artisanal small 
producers, and inclusive rather than exclusive (Smillie, 2012).   
Given the orientation of Malawi’s national development programmes and the mining 
policy machinery in place in sub-Saharan Africa, the agreement forged between the 
Distribution Consortium and the Government of Malawi is in no way inappropriate. But it 
remains unclear how, given the deliberate omission of the country’s impoverished small-scale 
gemstone miners, it could ever ‘change unequal relationships between producers and 
consumers [to] empower producers’ (Tallontire, 2002: 13), the stated objective of Fair Trade. 
The agenda for ‘ethical’ minerals is nevertheless evolving rapidly. Schemes such as NyalaTM 
ruby, however, could steer the agenda down a different path to that of agro-products, the 
heavy preoccupation with traceability in this case overshadowing some of more important 
pillars of Fair Trade, in particular, empowerment of the small producer.  
 
                                                          
31
 www.kimberleyprocess.com/ (accessed 12 July 2012). 
32
 Established in 2008, the Diamond Development Initiative is an NGO which, alongside government, 
NGO and industry partners, helps to address, in a comprehensive manner, the many problems facing 
the artisanal diamond mining sector, and empower its operators. See www.ddiglobal.org (accessed 11 
January 2013). 
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